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A. The discourse about the purposes of  civil justice systems is 
a classic topic of  civil procedure scholarship.1 The distinction between 
conflict-resolution and policy-implementation goals as elaborated by 
Mirjan Damaška in his seminal book on the faces of  justice and state 
authority2 can serve as an appropriate starting point. The downsides of  
this distinction are well-known.3 Yet, the presence of  dichotomies within 
the field of  civil procedure is deeply rooted in its history. Civil procedure 
has suffered, probably more than other fields of  law, from the fixing of  
boundaries among branches of  law, in particular from the great divide 
between private and public law, which is a historical peculiarity arising 
from natural-law doctrine (XVII and XVIII century).
According to the natural-law doctrine, the raison d’être of  civil 
procedure is to overcome the status naturalis in the status civilis, as a means to 
* The research leading to this contribution has received funding in the framework of  the research project of  national 
interest (PRIN) 2012 (2012SAM3KM) on Codification of  EU Administrative Procedures, financed by the Italian Ministry 
of  the University (coordinator Prof. Jacques Ziller, University of  Pavia).
1 This first section draws on Caponi, Harmonizing Civil Procedure: Some Initial Remarks, in: Kramer/Hess (Hg.), From 
Common Rules to Best Practices in European Civil Procedure, Nomos/Ashgate, 2017.
2 Damaška, The Faces of  Justice and State Authority, 1986.
3 Zekoll, “Comparative Civil Procedure”, in: Zimmermann/Reimann, The Oxford Handbook of  Comparative Law, 
2006, 1335.
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overcome resort to self-help.4 The regulation of  civil proceedings became 
a fundamental part of  public law,5 constituting a pillar of  state building in 
continental Europe: the prohibition of  self-help and state civil justice, as 
a trade-off  for such a prohibition. On the other side, the basic elements 
of  civil proceedings (from standing to sue, to adjudication) were aimed at 
protecting the “new bourgeois individual” and his economic freedom in 
a fragmented and individualistic perspective on social relationships. Thus, 
civil procedure was Janus-faced or acted as an interface: one face looked 
to public law, as civil proceedings are mainly set up by the state; the other 
looked to private law, as civil proceedings aim to protect individual rights. 
The great divide between private and public law caused the theory and 
practice of  judicial protection of  rights to be affected by a sort of  magnetic 
field and to oscillate between these two opposite conceptual poles.
The tension between the private interest of  litigants and the public 
interest of  the State as a provider of  dispute resolution services is an 
“eternal” feature of  civil procedure. However, the extent to which the 
State (or the polity) is involved in the business of  dispute resolution 
may vary considerably across time, ranging from a minimum in which 
the only relevant public interest is to keep the conflict-resolution services 
running at the minimum cost, chiefly providing incentives for the 
litigants to settle their dispute through an alternative dispute resolution 
procedure, to a maximum in which the resolution of  the dispute is the 
occasion for the State (or the polity) to apply a body of  substantive law, 
implementing where appropriate social goals and policies going beyond 
the mere resolution of  a dispute. This holds even truer in the European 
Union, as the regulation of  disputes with cross-border implications by the 
European law of  civil procedure is a remarkable example of  the presence 
of  public policy concerns, in terms of  the unobstructed operation of  
the internal market and development of  an area of  freedom, security 
and justice. Therefore, taking into account current developments in 
western legal systems, the key opposition, as to the goals of  civil justice 
systems, appears to be between the “pure and simple” (interest-based) 
settlement of  disputes and the application of  the law on the occasion of  
4 nörr, Naturrecht und Zivilprozess, 1976, 3, 48.
5 Boehmer, Ius publicum universale, ex genuinis iuris naturae principiis deductum et in usum iuris publici particularis qua-
rum cunque rerum publicarum adornatum, Halae Magdeburgicae, 1710, 499.
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the (settlement of  the) dispute. In this context, the only shared principle 
(besides independence and impartiality of  the court, and the right to be 
heard) might be the key element of  a common political culture, which 
places the rights of  the individual at the centre of  economic, social and 
legal activity. Placing the individual at the centre of  the economic and legal 
system follows the principles of  party autonomy and party disposition 
that shape dispute resolution methods. Accordingly, it is for the parties 
and not the government to choose suitable dispute resolution methods 
and to decide upon its commencement, scope and termination.
One is confronted with two competing accounts of  the role of  
civil justice. There is the older (or rather: classical) one, according 
to which European states, as polities embodying the rule of  law, are 
committed to the principle that relationships among its citizens must 
be governed by the law and not by the survival of  the fittest. Dispute 
resolution methods should also be governed by a system of  public and 
private law fairly applied and evenly enforced. Since the government is 
involved as provider of  dispute resolution services, the state justice system 
has a duty to implement public policies that go beyond the “pure and 
simple” resolution of  the dispute. The first policy is to enable the parties 
to choose dispute resolution mechanisms in a way that is truly free and 
informed, removing various barriers to access to justice. Second, to apply 
the law on the occasion of  a dispute is the primary purpose of  the civil 
justice system. The resolution of  the dispute is not only about protecting 
individual rights. Nor simply is it about restoring peace between the 
parties to a dispute. The determination and enforcement of  rights leads to 
the ongoing development and improvement of  the law itself. The law is 
preserved in judgments, and only judgments can develop the law.
By contrast, a newer account of  dispute resolution emerged in the 
great debates on ADR in the mid-1980’s in the United States and in the 
mid-1990’s in Europe, as well as the subsequent implementation of  ADR 
programs on both sides of  the Atlantic, which was an essential break 
with tradition in Western dispute resolution. Until then, settling a dispute 
through an out-of-court agreement or litigating the case before courts 
and seeking adjudication reflected the individual choice of  the parties. 
After the large scale development of  ADR schemes, the alternative 
between settlement and adjudication has become an institutional choice. 
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Litigation before state courts, on this model, tends to be a last resort. 
There is a general preference for alternative dispute resolution over 
judicial proceedings before state courts and hard law. By way of  example, 
according to the Consumer ADR Directive, even when the ADR entity 
“imposes” a particular outcome on the consumer, this solution need 
not comply with the general law – but only with that part of  consumer 
protection law that the parties cannot derogate from to the detriment of  
consumers (Art. 11).66 Further arguments to support ADR procedures 
point to those kinds of  disputes which are more suited for settlement 
through mediation and other alternative dispute resolution approaches.
B. The aim of  my presentation is to show the extent to which 
the use of  indicators for evaluating and comparing the performance of  
national judicial systems is not only able to describe the state of  affairs in 
the civil justice systems, which are the target of  these surveys, but also to 
exert pressure for changes in the purposes of  the judicial systems at large.
C. There is no generally shared meaning for the term ‘indicator’, 
but for the sake of  this paper the following definition suffices:
“An indicator is a named collection of  rank-ordered data that 
purports to represent the past or projected performance of  
different units. The data are generated through a process that 
simplifies raw data about a complex social phenomenon. The 
data, in this simplified and processed form, are capable of  being 
used to compare particular units of  analysis (such as countries, 
institutions, or corporations), synchronically or over time, and 
to evaluate their performance by reference to one or more 
standards”.7
The production of  indicators in global governance has, from 
the start of  this century, rapidly spread.8 Focusing only on the use of  
indicators in cross-country comparative surveys of  judicial systems, one 
6 Wagner, “Private Law Enforcement through ADR. Wonder Drug or Snake Oil?”, 51 Common Market Law Review 
2014, 165, 177.
7 Davis/Kingsbury/Engle Merry, Indicators as a Technology of  Global Governance, in: 46 Law & Soc’y Rev. 71 Law and 
Society Review, 2012, 71, 73.
8 For a global account, Davis/Fisher/Kingsbury, Governance by Indicators. Global Power through Classification and 
Rankings, 2012; Davis/Kingsbury, Indicators as Interventions: Pitfalls and Prospects in Supporting Development Initiatives, 
2011, http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org, (zuletzt abgerufen 22.9.2017).
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can enumerate a number of  institutions that create or propagate indicators. 
Most influential are the data about the performance of  judicial systems 
that are produced – within wider comparisons including rankings on the 
attractiveness of  different legal systems for doing business – by the Doing 
Business Project (World Bank Group).9
This project found fertile ground not only in developing countries, 
but also in Europe, where the “sound operation” of  the internal market, 
i.e. a policy relating to the economic growth, represented the public policy 
goal that led to the adoption of  rules of  judicial jurisdiction intended to be 
both highly predictable and to simplify the enforcement of  judgments in 
the Member States.10 In light of  the success of  the Doing Business annual 
reports, it is not difficult to explain the emergence of  detailed evaluation 
report on European judicial systems, published every second year since 
2006 by the European Commission for the Efficiency of  Justice (CEPEJ)11. 
This biennial report aims to measure and compare the efficiency and 
effectiveness of  European judicial systems. It has been used since 2013 
as a database to create a simplified and more appealing information tool, 
which aims to shed light on the quality, independence and efficiency of  
justice systems as co-determinants of  economic growth in the Member 
States of  the European Union12 Finally, in 2013 a cross-country inquiry into 
the performance of  judicial system with a wealth of  measurements and 
quantitative data was carried out under the auspices of  the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).13
9 www.doingbusiness.com, (zuletzt abgerufen 22.9.2017).
10 ECJ 10 February 1994 – Case C-398/92 (Mund & Fester) [1994] ECR I-474 is a landmark decision on the link between 
the Brussels Convention and European integration. The Maastricht Treaty placed judicial cooperation within the 
competence of  the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar of  the European Union (the so-called third pillar). The Amsterdam 
Treaty amended Art. 65 of  the EC Treaty to give the Community competence for “improving and simplifying […] the 
recognition and enforcement of  decisions in civil and commercial cases, including decisions in extrajudicial cases”. On 
that basis, the Brussels Convention was replaced by Council Regulation EC 44/2001 and the underlying public policy 
concerns have been widened towards the objective of  maintaining and developing an area of  freedom, security and 
justice, where the free movement of  persons is ensured. Under the Lisbon Treaty, this subject matter is governed by Arts. 
67 and 81 Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU).
11 The CEPEJ was established in 2002 within the Council of  Europe. www.coe.int, (zuletzt abgerufen 22.09.2017); the 
fifth report was published in 2014, Uzelac, Efficiency of  European Justice Systems: The Strength and Weaknesses of  the 
CEPEJ Evaluations, in International Journal of  Procedural Law, 1 (2011), 106.
12 The tool referred to is the EU Justice Scoreboard published since 2013 by the EU Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/effective-justice/files/justice_scoreboard_2014_en.pdf, (zuletzt abgerufen 22.09.2017).
13 Palumbo/Giupponi/nunziata/Mora-Sanguinetti, Judicial Performance and its Determinants: a Cross-Country Perspective, 
http://www.oecd.org, (zuletzt abgerufen 22.09.2017).
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The increasing use of  indicators to evaluate and compare judicial 
systems may at first be difficult to understand. It is indeed pertinent to ask 
to what extent the diversity of  arrangements and institutions through which 
justice is administered around the world can be grasped and equalized by 
a kind of  one-size-fits-all toolbox of  indicators. Answering this question 
would require a close look at the social processes surrounding the creation 
and use of  indicators in the field of  civil procedure.
D. One can start along this path by assessing the impact of  indicators 
on the reforms of  the Italian civil justice system in the last ten years.
In the early summer of  2014, the Renzi government announced a 
number of  reforms of  the judicial system.14 The programme also included 
changes in the field of  civil procedure, which were rapidly enacted in 
Autumn 2014.15
These changes aim to both decrease the duration of  civil proceedings 
at first instance and to reduce the huge backlog of  cases before the Italian 
courts. Whether the legislator should take action is assessed through 
comparative data about the duration of  civil proceedings in a dozen 
countries, drawn on the “Doing Business 2014” Report of  the World 
Bank. Further numerical data about backlogs of  cases, the “productivity” 
(i.e. clearance rate) of  courts, and the duration of  proceedings are taken 
from the 2014 edition of  the “EU Justice Scoreboard”, issued by the EU 
Commission.16
According to these surveys, when a business operating in Italy files 
a lawsuit, it must wait three times longer to obtain a final decision vis-a-vis 
competitors operating in Sweden, the best performing judicial system 
among those taken into consideration. The Italian government claims that 
undue delays hamper economic growth and, secondly, violate the right to 
a fair trial.17
Relying on these data, the Italian government decided to take 
action, which involved promoting a kind of  court-annexed arbitration, 
and negotiation supported by the parties’ counsel.
14 http://tinyurl.com/pnfz9tf, (zuletzt abgerufen 22.09.2017).
15 Decree no. 132/2014 and Law no. 162/2014.
16 http://preview.tinyurl.com/kvbxk4g, (zuletzt abgerufen 22.09.2017).
17 European Convention of  Human Rights, Art. 6; Italian Constitution, Art. 111.
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This short account brings to light a number of  significant elements: 
first, the use of  indicators to evaluate the performance of  a judicial system 
in comparative perspective; second, the reliance on indicators created or 
propagated by international institutions, such as the World Bank and 
the European Commission, rather than on those produced by domestic 
agencies such as the National Institute for Statistics (Istat),18 which is 
the main producer of  statistical data in Italy, or the Ministry of  Justice19, 
which is the main producer of  judicial statistics, institutions which are in 
a closer position to gather data about the Italian judicial system; third, 
the overriding consideration that the performance of  the domestic 
judicial system primarily impacts the country’s economic growth, and 
as a secondary concern delay jeopardises the right to a fair trial; fourth, 
the capacity of  indicators to determine the need for reforms, stimulating 
them, and orientating their substance.
Yet, the most surprising element does not emerge from the above 
narrative. It is the complete silence of  Italian legal scholarship in civil 
procedure about this set of  phenomena,20 although their existence along 
with the reform process of  civil procedure can be traced back to 2005, less 
than two years after the first appearance of  the Doing Business Reports.21 
This is easily explained through illuminating the differences between the 
key aspects of  the reform process in Italy before and after the advent of  
the Doing Business Project.
E. Civil litigation in Italy is governed by the Code of  Civil 
Procedure, which entered into force in 1942 and is still in force, although 
it has been heavily amended.22 Most reforms had been adopted by specific 
laws, dedicated to civil procedure, mostly amending the code.23 They 
pursued different, even opposing goals over time, and have been more or 
less successful at achieving these goals: lawyers’ laziness had been perhaps 
18 www.istat.it/en, (zuletzt abgerufen 22.09.2017).
19 www.giustizia.it, (zuletzt abgerufen 22.09.2017).
20 Graziadei (Hg.), Annuario di diritto comparato e di studi legislativi, 2012, which does not specifically address the use of  
indicators in the field of  civil procedure, the only (partial) exception being Takahashi, The emergence of  judicial statistics 
in England and Wales, 81.
21 The first report Doing Business 2004 was published in 2003.
22 De Cristofaro/Trocker, Civil Justice in Italy, 2010, 1.
23 Cf. above all Law no. 581 of  1950; Law no. 533 of  1973; Law no. 533 of  1990; Law no. 374 of  1991; Law no. 51 of  1998.
79 R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 21, n. 3, t. 1, p. 72-86, set.-dez., 2019 
T
O
M
O
 1
too much tolerated by the reform of  1950; proceedings had been perhaps 
too much tightened by the reform of  1973, regulating special proceedings 
about labor disputes. Each reform had rationales and objectives that are 
typical of  procedural reforms, especially in a Civil Law country. On the 
one hand, reforms try to balance access to the courts and effective judicial 
protection of  rights, on the other, they promote the right to be heard. In a 
few cases, laws introducing new substantive rights, or remarkable changes 
to existing rights, also included new procedural devices in order to ensure 
effective judicial protection of  such rights.24
The last remarkable reform before the advent of  the Doing Business 
Project consisted in the introduction of  special proceedings concerning 
corporate disputes in 200325. It marked a new approach to the regulation of  
ordinary proceedings, providing a number of  written exchanges between 
the lawyers before the court is addressed in order to manage the proceedings. 
This kind of  made-in-Italy ‘adversarial’ pleading from the outset bristled 
with difficulties for lawyers, and proved to be inefficient over time and 
therefore doomed to failure. It was abolished in 2009.26 Yet, it was still in 
tune with the Italian approach to legislative changes in the field of  civil 
procedure, as to three fundamental aspects: a) since the reform of  1973 (at 
the latest), the idea that the same procedural rules should be available for 
all civil law suits (i.e. the “transsubstantive” character of  procedural rules, 
to speak in U.S. jargon) has been fundamentally rejected and an approach 
heading toward a “differentiated judicial protection of  rights” has been 
adopted, with a view to ensuring a more effective judicial protection of  
rights (tutela giurisdizionale differenziata, an approach and expression coined 
by Andrea Proto Pisani)27; the reform of  2003 followed this approach, 
linking the introduction of  new proceedings to changes in the field of  
corporate law; b) the purposes of  legislative changes were quite typical of  
procedural reforms i.e. a more speedy and effective dispute resolution, in 
tune with the fair trial guarantee, without any reference to the country’s 
24 Art. 28, Law no. 300 of  1970, Statuto dei lavoratori.
25 Art. 12, Law 366/2001 and D. lgs 5/2003.
26 Law no. 69 of  2009.
27 In recent years, however, A. Proto Pisani seems to have changed his mind on this point, in light of  misleading 
applications by the lawgiver over time, cf. Riflessioni critiche sulla tutela giurisdizionale differenziata, in Lavoro e 
diritto, 2014, 537.
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economic growth (although such a reference might have been appropriate, 
in light of  the substance of  the reform); c) finally, the reform of  2003 was 
enacted by means of  a specific law, dedicated to changes in the field of  
civil procedure.28
F. One can detect dramatic changes to this approach to civil justice 
reform since 2005, that can be fully explained only if  takes account of  the 
ongoing influence of  the Doing Business annual reports and their success 
in attracting the attention of  policy-makers and government officials in Italy.
The Doing Business Project has already provoked a considerable 
amount of  reactions from legal scholars in the United States and beyond. 
Yet, there are a number of  reasons why it is timely for a civil procedure 
scholar to intervene with comments29. First of  all, the pilot-project that 
led to the launch of  the Doing Business Project was a world-wide survey 
on civil procedure.30 Secondly, consider the thesis underpinning the Doing 
Business Project, i.e. that legal origin impacts economic growth and the 
common law is more conducive to economic growth than the civil law. 
Now, while the difference between civil and common law might not be 
relevant for most areas of  law surveyed by the legal origins literature, yet, 
the civil law/common law divide remains relevant for civil procedure.31 
Thirdly, both explanations proffered for the greater impact of  the common 
law on economic development – greater independence of  common law 
judges and the greater adaptability of  the common law – are both mainly 
grounded in differences of  procedure.32
By focusing on the key features of  the Doing Business reports one 
can identify how these reports are the fundamental cause of  the changes 
in Italian civil procedure since 2005.
28 Cf. Decreto legislativo no. 5 of  2003.
29 The Doing Business Project and has not gained the attention of  civil-procedure scholars yet, with few exceptions, Kern, 
Justice between Simplification and Formalism. A discussion and critique of  the World Bank sponsored Lex Mundi Project 
on Efficiency of  Civil Procedure, 2007.
30 Cf. Working Paper n. 8890 (2002) of  National Bureau of  Economic Research (Cambridge, Massachusetts), http://
www.nber.org, (zuletzt abgerufen 22.09.2017); Djankov/La Porta/Lopez-de-Silanes/Schleifer, Courts, Quarterly Journal of  
Economics, 2003, 453.
31 Damaška, The Common Law / Civil Law Divide: Residual Truth of  a Misleading Distinction, in: Chase/Walker (Hg.), 
Common Law, Civil Law and the Future of  Categories, 2010.
32 Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis Doing Business Reports and the Silence of  Traditional 
Comparative Law, 57 The American Journal of  Comparative Law, 765 (2009), 781.
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First of  all, changes in civil procedure are frequently included 
in “omnibus” statutes, no longer in specific (i.e. dedicated only to civil 
procedure) statutes. Such statutes normally introduce new regulations 
relating to a number of  areas of  the life of  a business, e.g. starting a 
business, obtaining credit, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing 
contracts, resolving insolvency, etc. Most of  these topics are included in the 
Doing Business report on the ease of  doing business. Furthermore, such 
statutes are labelled with a kind of  catch-all purpose, such as economic 
growth, development, and competitiveness.33 Such statutory provisions 
are particularly apt to gain the attention of  the Doing Business’ expert 
team in subsequent rounds of  evaluation, promoting a country’s position 
in the global ranking.
Regulation texts are drafted more than ever by government officials, 
with little exposure to debate and critique. Indeed, government officials 
frequently attend international meetings and participate in international 
networks, where the pressure generated by international and regional 
ranking is far stronger than in a domestic setting.
Parliamentary control and ratification of  governmental regulation 
is often carried out by the Industry or Trade Committees, where 
parliamentarians with a legal background are seldom present. Justice 
and Legal Affairs Committees, which are largely comprised of  lawyers, 
play only a marginal role. This does not occur by chance, but reflects to 
some extent the main findings of  the pilot study that triggered the Doing 
Business Project: “we find that […] formalism is systematically greater 
in civil than in common law countries, and is associated with higher 
expected duration of  judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, 
less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption”.34 It comes as no 
surprise that governments in civil law countries, which are eager to please 
Doing Business reports, try to marginalize the lawyers’ role, particularly 
when they are civil procedure and litigation experts.
A further feature of  the recent Italian civil procedure legislation, 
which can best be explained as a consequence of  the pressure exercised 
by the Doing Business Report, is the proliferation of  new statutes in the 
33 Cf. Law no. 80 of  2005, Law no. 69 of  2009, Law no. 99 of  2009, Law no. 27 of  2012, Law no. 92 of  2012, Law no. 
134 of  2012, Law no. 98/2013, Law no. 162 of  2014.
34 Djankov/La Porta/Lopez-de-Silanes/Schleifer, op. cit. (Fn. 31), 453.
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last ten years. Since 2005, new statutory provisions have entered into force 
almost continuously, which tracks the cycle of  the annual or biennial 
reports of  the ranking institutions.
Moreover, it is the entering into force of  the statutes that counts, 
and not its effective implementation, because the former can be better 
reckoned in statistics than the latter.
Mediation and arbitration are promoted instead of  adjudication, 
because ADR is a cheaper means of  dispute resolution than judicial 
proceedings.
Finally, grounds of  judicial appeal are narrowed, as the delays they 
generate are not in tune with the theoretical model of  an ideal court that 
eases business, whereby a dispute “can be resolved by a third on fairness 
grounds, with little knowledge or use of  law, no lawyers, no written 
submissions, no procedural constraints on how evidence, witnesses, and 
arguments are presented, and no appeal”35.
G. If  I had the occasion to analyze the causes of  the inefficiency 
of  Italian civil justice system, I could easily show that the complexity and 
distinctive features of  each national judicial system cannot be captured by 
the use of  quantitative indicators.
By way of  example, according to the EU Justice Scoreboard, “the 
efficiency of  a judicial system should already be reflected at first instance, 
as the first instance is an obligatory step for everyone going to court”. 
However, today, ordinary proceedings are no longer the key instrument 
for ensuring judicial protection of  rights in Italy. In fact, over the last 
few decades, they are becoming less and less important, even residual, 
to that end. In order to take a correct view of  the real states of  affairs 
in Italy,36 one should take into consideration a large number of  “special” 
proceedings, which normally enable claimants to get effective and efficient 
judicial protection of  rights in a wide range of  situations. As of  2013, the 
number of  cases brought into the courts by way of  special proceedings 
35 Djankov/La Porta/Lopez-de-Silanes/Schleifer, op. cit. (Fn. 31), 455.
36 Cf. for an inquiry into the causes of  Italian civil justice system’s inefficiency, s. Caponi, European Minimum Standards 
for Courts. Independence, Specialization, Efficiency. Glance from Italy, Paper presented at the conference “Europäische 
Mindeststandards für Spruchkörper”, organised by Althammer, University of  Regensburg Law School, and Weller, 
EBS Law School, at the University of  Regensburg on 12–13 November 2015, in Althammer/Weller (Hg.), Europäische 
Mindeststandards für Spruchkörper, 2017, 139–164.
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(especially payment orders and provisional measures) was substantially 
higher than the number of  plenary proceedings.37
H. However, there is no basis for dismissing the use of  indicators as 
so seriously deficient that they do not even deserve mention or contestation.
Exploring the Doing Business Project can be fascinating and 
rewarding for a lawyer, particularly a scholar in civil procedure, as it helps 
dispel the sense that civil procedure is distinct from the other fields of  the 
law, to say nothing of  the sense of  remoteness of  civil procedure from 
the society at large.
At first sight, this revelation seems to be in tune with Mauro 
Cappelletti’s viewpoint about the role of  procedural law. As he put it:
Procedural law is not just about techniques – methods to 
regulate the business of  courts. Procedural law, in the first 
place, details the role of  government, through public courts, in 
settling disputes, creating new substantive rules and policies, and 
implementing policies through law. Important public policies 
are at stake in decisions about when to encourage parties to 
litigate, how to shape their factual and legal claims, and whether 
to promote a strictly legal resolution as opposed to a negotiated 
settlement. How much law regulates social behavior depends 
in large part on how the machinery of  justice is constructed.38
However, the global ideological setting in which indicators have 
been implemented in the field of  civil procedure is different from that 
one in which Cappelletti wrote. As U. Mattei put it:
Cappelletti’s work […] witnessed a moment of  general 
optimism in the public interest model, an idea of  an activist, 
redistributive, democratizing, public-service-minded approach 
to the public sector in general and to private law in particular. 
In this intellectual mode of  thought, the Welfare State in 
Western Societies was seen as a point of  arrival in civilization, 
37 For further details on the special proceedings in the Italian civil justice system, s. Caponi, A Masterpiece at a Glance. 
Calamandrei, Introduzione allo Studio Sistematico dei Provvedimenti Cautelari, in: Cadiet/Hess/Requejo-Isidro (Hg.), 
Procedural Science at the Crossroads of  Different Generations, 2015, 373–380.
38 Cappelletti/Garth, Introduction – Policies, Trends and Ideas in Civil Procedure, in: David et al. (Hg.), International 
Encyclopedia of  Comparative Law, (M. Cappelletti Hg.), vol. XVI Civil Procedure, 1987, 1.
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and access to justice was the device through which communities 
could provide law as a public good, after having provided 
shelter, healthcare and education to the needy. Beginning in 
the early eighties, the global ideological picture had changed. 
Neo-liberal policies, inaugurated by prime minister Thatcher in 
Great Britain, […] and imported on a much weaker institutional 
background in Reagan’s America, were based on the very basic 
assumption that the welfare state was simply too expensive. […] 
Public shelter, health, education and justice for the poor were 
the natural “victims” of  such budget cuts.39
In my view the turn to neo-liberal policies had an influence on the 
development of  the use of  indicators in the field of  civil procedure, but 
deepening this aspect would require a separate inquiry.
To conclude, indicators are tremendously successful in attracting 
the attention of  policy makers and government officials, thus prompting 
considerable amounts of  benchmarking, dialogue and reform40. Indicators 
can be beneficial to foster comparative knowledge of  legal systems and 
promoting reforms. The information gathered through the creation and 
use of  indicators needs however to be integrated and corrected, both 
on the descriptive and the prescriptive side, far more than it currently 
happens, by the “local knowledge” of  lawyers and social scientists 
living and working in the targeted countries. This also reflects a certain 
methodological approach, which is best expressed by Clifford Geertz’ 
words: “Like sailing, gardening, politics and poetry, law and ethnography 
are crafts of  place: they work by the light of  local knowledge”.41
However, one should not endorse the Doing Business reports 
without reservation because they are redefining civil procedure in light of  a 
single end (transaction costs, neoliberal agenda), whereas civil procedure is 
about rights and other social interests not reducible to economic efficiency.
I. Zusammenfassung: Quantitative Indikatoren für die Evaluation 
von Rechtssystemen zu verwenden, ist für einen Juristen ein riskantes 
39 Mattei, Access to Justice. A Renewed Global Issue?, in: Boele-Woelki, S. van Erp (Hg.), General Reports of  the XVIIth 
Congress of  the International Academy of  Comparative Law, vol. 2, 2007, 383.
40 Davis/Kingsbury/Engle Merry, Indicators as a Technology of  Global Governance, Law & Society Review, 46 
(2012), 71, 92.
41 Geertz, Local Knowledge. Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, 1983, 167.
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Unterfangen, weil er oft keine Kontrolle über die Kriterien der 
Datengewinnung, -auswahl und -präsentation hat.42 Trotzdem muss er sich 
irgendwie daran beteiligen, weil sich der Gebrauch dieser Indikatoren zur 
Bewertung und zum Vergleich der Leistungsfähigkeit von Rechtssystemen 
seit Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts in bemerkenswerter Geschwindigkeit 
ausgebreitet hat. Indikatoren haben die Aufmerksamkeit von Politikern und 
Regierungsvertretern erregt; sie haben daher als Werkzeug europäischen 
und globalen Regierens einen starken Einfluss erlangt.
Wenn man sich nur auf  den Gebrauch von Indikatoren in 
länderübergreifenden Vergleichsstudien der Justizsysteme fokussiert, 
kann man eine Reihe von Institutionen aufzählen, die Indikatoren 
schaffen oder propagieren. Am einflussreichsten sind die Daten über 
die Leistungsfähigkeit von Justizsystemen die – innerhalb eines breiteren 
Vergleichs einschließlich des Rankings der Attraktivität verschiedener 
Rechtssysteme für Geschäfte – im Rahmen des Doing Business Projekts 
der Weltbank-Gruppe geschaffen werden. Dieses Projekt hat nicht nur 
in Entwicklungsländern, sondern auch in Europa einen Nährboden 
gefunden. Im Lichte des anhaltenden Erfolgs der jährlichen Doing Business 
Reports erklärt sich, warum der sehr detaillierte Evaluationsbericht über die 
europäischen Justizsysteme, der seit 2006 alle zwei Jahre durch die European 
Commission for the Efficiency of  Justice (CEPEJ) herausgegeben wird 
und darauf  zielt, die Effektivität und Leistungsfähigkeit der Rechtssysteme 
der europäischen Länder zu messen und zu vergleichen, seit 2013 als 
Datenbank genutzt wird, um ein vereinfachtes und ansprechenderes 
Informationsinstrument zu schaffen: Das EU-Justizbarometer (EU Justice 
Scoreboard), das durch die Europäische Kommission herausgegeben 
wird und die Qualität, Unabhängigkeit und Effizienz der Justizsysteme 
als mitbestimmende Faktoren für wirtschaftliches Wachstum in den 
EU-Mitgliedsstaaten beleuchten soll. Das EU-Justizbarometer kann auf  
seine Weise die Zersplitterung der Rechtsgrundlagen zur Harmonisierung 
des Zivilprozessrechts in Europa (insbesondere Art. 81 und 114 AEUV, 
aber auch Art. 102 und 118 AEUV) überwinden, indem es die nationalen 
Justizsysteme überwacht und ihre Leistungsfähigkeit vergleicht, mit dem 
Ziel, sie in funktionaler Hinsicht de facto zu harmonisieren.
42 This summary in German draws on Caponi, Das “EU Justice Scoreboard” der Europäischen Kommission, Italien, in: 
Zeitschrift für das Privatrecht der Europäischen Union, GPR, 2016, 113–114.
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Nach dem EU-Justizbarometer „soll die Leistungsfähigkeit eines 
Justizsystems schon in der ersten Instanz reflektiert werden, da die 
erste Instanz für jeden, der vor Gericht geht, ein notwendiger Schritt 
ist“. Hinsichtlich des italienischen Zivilprozesses trifft diese Aussage 
nicht zu. Ordentliche Erkenntnisverfahren sind in Italien nicht mehr 
das Schlüsselinstrument des gerichtlichen Rechtsschutzes. Tatsächlich 
sind sie in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten immer unwichtiger, ja sogar 
residual geworden. Um ein korrektes Bild der Lage in Italien zu erhalten, 
ist die große Zahl an Spezialverfahren zu berücksichtigen, die es dem 
Kläger normalerweise ermöglichen, in einer Fülle von Situationen 
effektiven Rechtsschutz zu erhalten. So war im Jahr 2013 die Zahl der 
beantragten Spezialverfahren (insbesondere Zahlungsbefehle und 
einstweilige Maßnahmen) wesentlich höher als die Zahl der ordentlichen 
Erkenntnisverfahren.
Auch der Abschnitt des EU-Justizbarometers zur richterlichen 
Unabhängigkeit ist insofern verbesserungsfähig, als er auf  heterogenen 
Quellen basiert (Weltwirtschaftsforum zur „wahrgenommenen Unabhän-
gigkeit“, European Network of  Councils for the Judiciary und EU-Kom-
mission zur „strukturellen Unabhängigkeit“), was zum Teil zu widers-
prüchlichen Ergebnissen führt.
Das EU-Justizbarometer hat noch einen langen Weg vor sich, 
um seine Ziele zu erreichen. Es ist zu empfehlen, dass die Kommission 
ihre Kompetenz in der Auswahl und Auswertung von Daten verbessert. 
Die Komplexität und die charakteristischen Besonderheiten eines jeden 
Justizsystems können durch die Fragebögen, die die Kommission in 
Zukunft in Europa versenden mag, nicht vollständig erfasst werden. 
Dennoch können Indikatoren nützlich sein, um vergleichende Kenntnisse 
über Justizsysteme zu fördern und Reformen zu begünstigen. Die 
Informationen, die durch die Schaffung und den Gebrauch von 
Indikatoren gesammelt werden, müssen viel stärker, als dies momentan 
geschieht, durch Juristen und Sozialwissenschaftler der betroffenen 
Länder einbezogen und gegebenenfalls korrigiert werden.
